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Abstract² %LJGDWDDQGF\EHUFULPHDUHFUHDWLQJµuSVWUHDP¶ELJ
data related cyber-dependent crimes such as data breaches. They 
are essential components in a cybercrime chain which forms a 
cybercrime ecosystem that cascades µGRZQVWUHDP¶to give rise to 
further crimes, such as fraud, extortion, etc., where the data is 
subsequently monetized. These downstream crimes have a massive 
impact upon victims and data subjects. The upstream and 
downstream crimes are often committed by entirely different 
offending actors against different victim groups, which 
complicates and frustrates the reporting, recording, investigative 
and prosecution processes. Taken together the FULPH VWUHDP¶V
cascade effect creates unprecedented societal challenges that need 
addressing in the face of the advances of AI and the IoT. This 
phenomenon is explored here by unpacking the TalkTalk case 
study to conceptualize how big data and cloud computing are 
creating cascading effects of disorganized, distributed and 
escalating data crime. As part of the larger CRITiCal project, the 
paper also hypothesizes key factors triggering the cascade effect 
and suggests a methodology to further investigate and understand 
it.  
 
Index Terms² cybercrime, big data, big data crime, cloud 
computing, crime scripts, crime cascade.  
I. INTRODUCTION: THE EVER-CHANGING NATURE OF 
CYBERCRIME2 
Cybercrime is an ever-changing and constantly evolving threat. 
In 2019, Symantec documented significant changes in attack 
vectors in 2018, for example a 63% fall in unique pieces of 
malware detected per year during the year (from 670m in 2017) 
contrasted with a dramatic increase in attacks that in one way 
or another target data such as web attacks (+56%), mobile 
ransomware (+33%) and supply chain attacks (+78%) plus 
formjacking3 (no corresponding 2017 data) [41]. Although 
indicating a shift in offender priorities, this change reflects two 
predominant features in cybercrime over the past decade. The 
first is an appetite for gaining unauthorized access to data for 
financial or intelligence gain [17]. Europol, for example, found 
in their IOCTA report (p. 22) that over one third of Member 
States reported incidents relating to illegal acquisition of data 
[19] (p. 7). The illegal acquisition of data via data breaches not 
only disrupts businesses and organisations but also facilitates 
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further criminal activity [19]. The second constant feature of 
cybercrime is the development of deepweb marketplaces selling 
stolen data and other stolen goods, as well as cybercrime-as-a-
service [43][19][16].  
The development of deepweb marketplaces has attracted 
considerable attention and led to discussions about the 
emergence of mafia type µRUJDQL]HGF\EHUFULPH¶ groups online 
[24][6][23]. This observation is disputed [44][22], as we 
discuss later in the paper, because it seems that different 
offending groups and unconnected individuals are 
simultaneously involved, although there is further research still 
to be done to look at the organised nature of groups operating 
in dark marketplaces [28]. Here we mainly focus upon big data 
crime (mainly Data Breaches, DDoS attacks and Spamming), 
which result from big data and cloud computing and are 
arguably the underlying causes of most modern cybercrime.  
Today, Big Data is a massive industry whose potential for 
monetization attracts legitimate businesses and cybercriminal 
entrepreneurs alike. The paradigm of cloud computing makes 
increased connectivity and data processing possible, thereby 
supporting the flourishing of both big data and cybercrime. As 
we suggested in earlier articles [34] (p. 216), Big Data Crimes 
[47] are upstream and cyber-dependent [46] but µcascade¶ crime 
downstream to enable cyber-enabled and even cyber-assisted 
cybercrimes [46]. This cascade is very hard to track and 
counter, but we hope to identify various tipping points where 
information and data cascade downwards to facilitate further 
crime. By catching actions at such tipping points, for example, 
the data dump or point of sale, then the subsequent µcrime 
frenzy¶ could in theory be prevented.  
In this paper we seek to conceptualise the µcascade effect¶ 
and in so doing, also identify key µtipping points¶ upon which 
law enforcement action can be focused. To illustrate this 
process, we draw upon a case study of the data breach suffered 
by TalkTalk Telecom Group PLC (hereafter TalkTalk) in 2015 
[5]. The discussion below refers to past events and relies on the 
TalkTalk case because so much information is available in the 
public domain which enables us to not only understand the 
processes of victimisation and the cascade, but also the 
response of the criminal justice system and incident prevention, 
whilst also helping us propose VXFKDWWDFNVDVµLGHDOW\SHV¶IRU
EP/M020576/1) and the EMPHASIS projects (µEconoMical, PsycHologicAl & 
Societal Impact of RanSomware¶ - EPSRC, EP/P011772/1). 
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future analysis. We should also point out that although this case 
caused TalkTalk major embarrassment and financial loss, 
significant security improvements have since been made and 
the company has recovered. Moreover, our use of this case is 
primarily illustrative and is not intended to claim casual 
inference [64]. 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE TALKTALK CASE  
In October 2015, news outlets extensively covered a data 
breach suffered by TalkTalk, a UK based TV, broadband, 
mobile and phone provider [5][18][45]. The scale of the breach 
was such as to cause the launch of a parliamentary inquiry into 
cyber security and the protection of personal data online, 
published in June 2016 [14]. This breach is also significant 
because it was very well documented from inception to 
prosecution and the circumstances of the breach and (for 
researchers) the detection, arrest and prosecution of the 
offenders reveal in considerable detail the construction of a 
modern µ%LJ¶cybercrime. More importantly, this case study, as 
indicated earlier, also reveals important information about the 
levels of interdependency within the modern cybercrime 
ecosystem and, where relevant, the division of labour within the 
offender group.  
The TalkTalk breach exposed personal information 
FRQWDLQHGLQDGDWDEDVHFDOOHGµ7LVFDOL0DVWHU¶accessible from 
webpages [18] that were inherited from Tiscali, which TalkTalk 
had acquired in 2009 via Carphone House.  
In October 2015, hacker(s) using the alias ³)HDUIXO´ DQG
³*OXE]´ used the SQL map programme, an open source 
SHQHWUDWLRQWHVWLQJWRRO³that automates the process of detecting 
and exploiting SQL injection flaws and taking over of database 
servers´4 to probe the webpages. ³*OXE]´IRXQGYXOQHUDELOLWLHV
in three of the old Tiscali webpages now owned by TalkTalk 
[18].UHEVUHSRUWVWKDW³*OXE]´SRVWHGWKHYXOQHUDELOLW\LQWKH
YLGHRVVHFWLRQRI7DON7DON¶V:HEVLWH5 on October 18th [21], but 
WKDW³*OXE]´GLGQRWpersonally exploit the information [21].  
The flaw was further reported on xssposed.org, which Krebs 
describes as a site that operates as a clearinghouse for unpatched 
vulnerabilities. It is not clear whether it was reported by 
³*OXE]´ RU E\ +DQOH\ VHH below), or someone else. 
Xssposed.org verified that the flaw existed but did not release 
technical details to the public so that TalkTalk would have time 
to patch the vulnerability, thereby protecting its users [21].  
Bisson [5] reported that Richard De Vere, Principal 
Consultant for the AntiSocial Engineer Ltd., contacted 
TalkTalk to inform them of a serious vulnerability on October 
21st. The company did not act on these warnings at the time. 
Later, on October 21st, the same day that De Vere had warned 
TalkTalk, Bisson [5] notes that DownDetector6 recorded a spike 
in technical issues associated with TalkTalk. Customers had 
problems making calls or logging into their email XQWLOWKH,63¶V
website became completely unavailable. According to Krebs, 
the DDoS (denial-of-service attacks), which prevented 
legitimate users from accessing the website, were launched to 
distract TalkTalk security from the SQLi attack to hack the 
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database [21]. The TalkTalk website was allegedly attacked 
over 14,000 times [11][18]. 
Bisson [5] found that, on October 23rd, Trista Harrison, 
Managing Director (Consumer) of TalkTalk, had posted an 
³XSGDWH RQ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V website´ explaining that TalkTalk 
had VXIIHUHG D ³VLJQLILFDQW DQG VXVWDLQHG F\EHU-DWWDFN´ two 
days before +DUULVRQ H[SODLQHG WKDW ³WKH QDPHV DGGUHVVHV
dates of birth, and credit card/bank details of as many as four 
million TalkTalk customers might have been compromised by 
the hack [5]. Furthermore, TalkTalk CEO Dido Harding 
confirmed TalkTalk received an email from a group alleging 
responsibility for the breach and requesting a ransom in return 
for not publishing or selling the data [5]. Eventually Harding 
also received several blackmail attempts [37]. 
According to Krebs, multiple hacker collectives claimed 
responsibility for the hack; the BBC even claimed one as a 
³5XVVLDQ,VODPLVWJURXS´$WWKHVDPHWLPH³&RXUYRLVLHU´an 
identity later attributed to Grant West [36]), promised to post 
the stolen data on the now defunct deep web black market 
AlphaBay, which he promised would be in the following format 
[21]:  
Name; DOB; Address; TenancyType; 
YearsAtAddress; MonthsAtAddress; 
HomeTelephone; MobileTelephone; 
Email; Employer; EmploymentTitle; 
EmploymentLocation; EmployersPhone; 
Bank; AccountNumber; and SortCode.  
According to Krebs&RXUYRLVLHUDSSHDUHGWREHD³/HYHO
)UDXGDQG'UXJVVHOOHU´WKDWLVVRPHRQH³ZKRKDVVXFFHVVIXOly 
consummated at least 500 sales worth a total of at least $75,000 
and achieved a 90% positive feedback rating or better from 
SUHYLRXVFXVWRPHUV´ [21]. Two weeks after the attack, it was 
reported that another AlphaBay user, with the nickname of 
µ0DUWLDQ¶ was VHOOLQJ7DON7DONFXVWRPHUV¶EUHDFKHGILQDQFLDO
data for £1.62 a time [42].  
Bisson reports that, on October 24th, there were suggestions 
that hackers had exploited TalkTalk FXVWRPHUV¶ FUHGLW FDUG
details and bank accounts. Among them, Hilary Foster, a 
EDUULVWHU¶VFOHUNIURPVRXWKZHVW/RQGRQsaid she blocked her 
card after scammers stole cash from her bank account and used 
it to purchase £600 worth of goods. Another user had his 
broadband connection interfered with [5]. Another TalkTalk 
customer contacted The Register claiming to have lost £3,500 
days after the breach [25]. 
In her update of October 23rd, Trista Harrison explained that 
Dido Harding, the chief executive of the company, urged 
³FXVWRPHUVWREHZDU\RIXQH[SHFWHGSKRQHFDOOVWKDWDVNIRU
SHUVRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHLU7DON7DONDFFRXQWV´ 
[5]. Harding might have been wary of opportunistic scammers 
who may have accessed information about TalkTalk customers 
from dumped data and call breached victims at home to further 
defraud them. This was reported in a Channel 4 news program 
[7] which showed how a TalkTalk customer affected by the 
hack was subsequently scammed by two opportunistic young 
men based in India [9] who were not involved in the initial hack. 
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To be sure, such a scam is not specific to the October 2015 
TalkTalk breach. On October 25th TalkTalk customer Mike 
Barrie told BBC News that, a few months back, he had received 
a fraudulent call from a self-expressed TalkTalk employee [2]. 
Upon reporting the incident, the company DOOHJHGO\ ³GLGQ¶W
VHHPYHU\LQWHUHVWHG´ Mr Barrie believed TalkTalk might have 
already been hacked in the past [5], as the Information 
&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V 2IILFH ,&2 ZRXOG ODWer confirm [39]. 
Actually, Ms Harding might have also been wary of another 
form of scam involving the abuse of personal data which came 
under the scrutiny of the ICO. Indeed, on top of the £400,000 
fine for the 2015 breach (which was a very harsh penalty prior 
to the DPA 2018), TalkTalk also received a £100,000 fine by 
the ICO [57, 58], because employees based in the Wipro call 
centres in India misused data of TalkTalk customers in a scam 
where they posed as engineers offering to fix remotely an 
ostensible vulnerability on their computers. This is completely 
unrelated to the October 2015 data breach. 
Simply put, scammers may have used known techniques to 
try to further target victims of the TalkTalk hack. Or, they may 
have tried to prey on victims. The Daily Mail¶VSam Greenhill 
was also affected by the TalkTalk hack. He was the object of 
opportunistic calls by engineers posing as TalkTalk computer 
support personnel [13]. The people who contacted him did not 
refer to the hack, but instead offered to provide Windows-
related support. 
III. TALKTALK AND THE CASCADE EFFECT  
7KHµFKDLQ¶RILQWUXVLRQ, a.k.a. the attack chain, is a recognized 
concept [17]. It refers to the fact that cybercrime requires 
offenders to successfully progress through a series of linked 
stages. For instance, data exfiltration requires accessing a 
system without authorization, which in turn presupposes 
several options, such as infecting websites, performing an SQL 
injection to assist removal of data, or sending an email 
containing an infected attachment. Proofpoint provide a very 
useful technical analysis of an attack chain in their Analysis of 
a Cybercrime Infrastructure [38][29]. They show 
systematically how a cybercrime group compromised PCs via a 
range of processes that included credential sniffing, uploading 
malware via compromised sites onto unprotected Windows XP 
machines. They then used those PCs to offer a sophisticated, 
paid proxying service to organized crime groups that turns 
infected 3&VLQWRDQLOOLFLWµSULYDWHFORXG¶, as well as infiltrating 
corporate networks [38]. What Proofpoint do not do is show 
how the individuals involved interacted with each other or 
establish the casual relationships which led to many big data 
cybercrimes, which is why the TalkTalk case is so important. 
Here we build on the notion of chain and cascade to propose 
tipping points at which the one cybercrime enables or facilitate 
different cybercrimes.  
A. The Cascade Process 
The TalkTalk case study roughly indicates six key stages at 
each of which cybercrime cascades downwards, though stages 
3 to 5 can happen simultaneously. From this we can construct 
our cascade model.  
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Stage 1: Discovery and disclosure of vulnerability 
A person (it might be a hacker or not) discovers a vulnerability 
on a FRPSDQ\¶V software, website, or application. They have 
different options to take. A µ:KLWH+DW¶(ethical) hacker might 
try to obtain a legitimate financial reward by informing the 
owning company of their vulnerability through bug-bounty 
programmes, such as those listed on BugCrowd7 and 
HackerOne.8 In such cases little more is heard about the 
vulnerability because it has been patched and the bug finder is 
paid off. When a disclosed vulnerability is ignored by the 
system owner, however, White Hat hackers may threaten to 
publicly disclose its existence to put pressure on the company 
to fix it. This was the case of 9to5mac discovering the $SSOH¶V
FaceTime eavesdropping exploit [26].  
When the motivation is driven by moral, revenge or 
reputation enhancement reasons, the offenders may post the 
information RQZHEIRUXPVRUDVGLGµ)HDUIXO¶DOLDVµ*OXb]¶
RQ7DON7DON¶VZHEVLWH [21]. In the TalkTalk breach, the flaw 
was also reported, allegedly E\VRPHRQHRWKHUWKDQµ)HDUIXO¶
via xssposed.org [21]. This is where information about the 
vulnerability can drift from ethical hacker (White hat) to the 
cracker (Black hat). Experienced malfeasants, for example, will 
seek to exploit vulnerabilities, especially if it is zero-day, by 
disclosing them to friends or by selling them on to anybody who 
will pay for the information.  
The disclosure of a vulnerability, when shared, sold or made 
public, is a primary tipping point for the cascade effect, 
unleashing the first crime frenzy of offenders trying to exploit 
the vulnerability.  
 
Stage 2: Exploitation of vulnerability 
Once the information contained in the data is circulated (either 
privately or in public) and the vulnerability has not been fixed, 
there is nothing to stop offenders from exploiting it. Offenders 
may use a different range of tools to exploit the vulnerabilities, 
for example, to distract security personnel and possibly weaken 
a system with a DDoS attack. DDoS attacks open the door for 
WRROVWRSHQHWUDWHWKHYLFWLP¶VZHDNHQHGsystem, for example, 
using an SQL injection to extract the data. In the case of 
TalkTalk, as mentioned earlier, it was reported that the 
vulnerability was exploited as many as 14,000 times [11]. 
Whilst this again raises the metaphor of a crime frenzy, it is 
highly likely many of those exploitations had little or no visible 
impact and suggests that many were exploiting the vulnerability 
for recreational purposes. Often, simply because they could, or 
out of intellectual curiosity, however, exploiting the 
vulnerability paves the way to another tipping point which 
unleashes further stages (3-5) of the cascade effect where the 
cybercrime and harm becomes a stark reality. 
 
Stage 3: Monetization of vulnerability 
Exploiting the vulnerability creates a power imbalance and 
leverage over the vulnerable (typically the system owner) 
which can then be monetized. The TalkTalk breach unveils one 
common path of monetization which is to demand the victim to 
pay a ransom for the stolen copies of the data to be returned. In 
other cases, such as ransomware, upon the payment the victim 
8
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is given a code which allegedly decrypts the data encoded by 
malware. In the TalkTalk case Hanley, Allsopp and Kelley 
demanded a ransom which, unless paid, would lead to them 
dumping the data in public. Alternatively, the data could be 
dumped into the black market or sold on, as in the case of 
µCourvoisier¶ [40]. In another case it was revealed that a hacker 
called µ0DUWLDQ¶EUDJJHGthat she or he could make £150,000 in 
profits by selling the data of 10,000 victims [49]. What this tells 
us is that information arising from the data dump can be 
monetized. This can be achieved by using the threat of the 
consequences of exposure to directly extort victims from whom 
the data was taken ± the system owner or the data subject. It can 
also be done by selling on the data, especially if it is personal 
or if it contains confidential personal or business information, 
such as trade secrets. This data dump constitutes another key 
tipping point in explaining the cascade effect.  
 
Stage 4: Buying or Trading Data (to commit further crimes) 
Offenders (typically fraudsters) may purchase the data to 
defraud or otherwise victimise, especially financial data which 
allows frauds such as carding (trafficking fraud devices), card-
not-present and account takeover to take place. Sometimes the 
financial data may not be strong enough to be used for, say, 
carding, but could enable an attacker to perform less 
sophisticated forms of attack. This was the case in the TalkTalk 
breach because 15,656 banking details and sort codes were 
stolen [18] and several victims reported being defrauded as a 
result of the TalkTalk breach. Unfortunately, it is currently not 
possible to actually ascertain how many had their banking 
details/sort code exploited as a direct result of the breach and 
how many fell victim to pretexting (scams based upon the hack, 
see further on). Yet, the number of victims is potentially 15,656 
people. At the same time, much of the data may not have been 
so easily monetizable because it was not complete, which 
would lead to stages 5 and 6.  
 
Stage 5: Turning Data into Crime or Retaining, Refining or 
Collecting Additional Data for Future Offending  
At times, the data is not enough to enable offenders (fraudsters) 
to immediately victimize. This was the case with TalkTalk 
FXVWRPHUV¶ SHUVRQDO LQIRUPDWLRQ (156,959) which was not 
attached to the corresponding 15,656 banking details and sort 
codes. Yet, offenders may still want to acquire personal data as 
a source of intelligence to commit other cyber-assisted crimes 
or even more traditional forms of frauds. Potentially, this 
unleashes a further crime frenzy, targeting (in the TalkTalk 
case) as many as 156,959 customers.  
Offenders may also delay using the data so that its capability 
to victimize can be enhanced by amalgamating further data 
from different sources about the victim. The attackers may, for 
example, develop spam lists for sending out phishing emails to 
acquire more personal data, which they may use to develop their 
databases of victims. Attackers may put up the repackaged 
information on sale, as in stage 3&4, which paves the way for 
another (mini) cybercrime tipping point. This was the case with 
µ&RXUYRLVLHU¶V¶ actions, possibly also in relation to the TalkTalk 
breach as he appeared to promise more information than was 
revealed to have been breached by news reports and the ICO 
[18].  
 
Stage 6 Pretexting: Exploiting confusion to commit new crimes 
As discussed earlier, a separate group of offenders ± scammers± 
not related or known to the original hackers or even the 
downsellers, may also try to exploit WKHGDWDVXEMHFWV¶confusion 
in the wake of the publicity from a data breach. Known as 
pretexting, scammers socially engineer a response from victims 
by drawing on prevailing public concerns such as a disaster, 
cancer, or in this case a hack, to develop a plausible story or 
pretext to deceive their victims [1]. So, using the very public 
TalkTalk breach as a pretext, scammers pretended to be from 
the company, knowing that there was a reasonable chance of 
the user being either a TalkTalk customer or being simply 
worried about the news reports of hacks. Once they got the 
victim worried, the pretexters would talk them through resetting 
their passwords so that other attackers could not use their 
compromised information to victimize them, which, of course, 
was both an irony and a lie. In other reported cases, scammers 
used different pretexts often posing as employees of UK 
Internet service providers (e.g. BT or TalkTalk), saying that 
they had been authorized by Microsoft to provide technical 
support [12]. Gallagher, an Ars Technica journalist, was 
targeted by pretexting scammers in a different scam and wrote 
about his experience. ³The scam « seeks to convince would-
be victims to install remote-access software on their computers 
and then to set up recurring credit card billing for technical 
support or anti-virus software´>@.  
$ IXUWKHU µFULPH VWUHDP¶ underlying stages 3-6 are the 
monetizers who help to facilitate downstream crimes (and 
possibly some upstream). They launder money, extract or 
broker currency from crimes. Depending upon the scale of the 
crime, they may collect money or turn bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies from ransomware into fiat money or employ 
money mules to extract money in cash from live accounts via 
ATMs or transfer money in short-term legitimate accounts that 
WKH\µORDQ¶RUVHWXSVSHFLILFDOO\IRUWKHSXUpose. We argue that 
the presence of monetizers introduces the potential for the 
development of organized criminal groups, but it is a potential 
observation which needs much further research to establish.  
 
B. Reflections on the Cybercrime Cascade Effect 
Figure 1 (below) illustrates the relationship between the first six 
stages. Steps 1-3 of the cascade are upstream crimes that 
roughly correspond to categories of cyber-dependent crime 
[46]. Steps 4-6 (and monetizers) are downstream crimes that 
largely correspond to cyber-enabled (facilitated by the internet) 
and cyber-assisted crimes (using the internet for convenience) 
[46]. As stated earlier, these µVWDJHV¶ are ideal types and we 
expect to find variations of the them in practice, but they 
demonstrate the key tipping points where upstream crimes 
cascade further downstream. Furthermore, each tipping point at 
stages 1-6 involves different forms of interaction between 
offenders, such as chat forums, underground data markets, 
cybercrime-as-a-service or networks of money mules. These 
µSLQFK SRLQWV¶ DUH ORFDWLRQV ZKHUH ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW FULPH
prevention and regulatory resources can be directed to make for 
more effective action. 
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The hallmark of the cascade-effect-crime-flow downstream 
LV WKDW WKHUHVXOWLQJµFULPHIUHQ]\¶ WKDW WHQGV WRRFFXU LVYHU\
hard for law enforcement to follow. What is more, upstream and 
downstream crimes tend to be committed by separate (groups 
of) offenders against different victim groups for very diverse 
motivations. All of which complicates and frustrates the basic 
process of conceptualization and ultimately reflects upon both 
the way that the media covers these offences and how they are 
viewed by law enforcement personnel, influencing the 
reporting, recording, investigative and prosecution processes.  
 
Figure 1 The Cybercrime Cascade Effect 
 
As a result of the cascade effect, cybercrimes therefore 
appear to be dis-organized in terms of their structure when 
viewed through the lens of centralizing9 contemporary crime 
and organised crime narratives [22][44]. But, those narratives 
are often oversimplified and misapplied because the offending 
activities are actually distributed rather than centralised. 
Distributed, not only in terms of the ways that offenders 
organize themselves to work together to commit offences via, 
for example, chat forums where they obtain skills, information 
and also collaborators, but also to actually deliver the offending 
activity [44].  
So, the organization of upstream cybercrime is distributed 
rather than centralized, as is often assumed. Furthermore, recent 
research [48] has identified different levels of sophistication in 
the distribution of criminal labour with regard to upstream and 
downstream cybercrimes. The upstream, big data-related 
cybercrimes are being committed by primary offender groups 
who range from Amateurs (e.g. wannabees and script kiddies), 
Hobbyists (e.g. ethical and unethical hackers) and Professionals 
(IT skills for hire) [8][48]. All of which are being enabled via 
cybercrime services operated by a secondary offender group ± 
the cybercrime kingpins. These kingpins are a separate level of 
offenders who enable cybercrime to take place and whose 
services to are commissioned by both upstream and 
downstream primary offenders to help them commit their 
crimes [48].  
It is important to note that each kingpin performs a different 
function but together form a facilitating infrastructure for the 
cybercrime ecosystem. Data brokers sell or trade data; 
Crimeware-as-a-service (CAAS) providers enable DDoS or 
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 (* DOZD\V ORRNLQJ IRU D µ0U %LJ¶ DQG DVVXPLQJ D KLJKHU IRUP RI
organization that protects its criminals and seeks to increase its power. 
ransomware attacks. Spammers use the data to send out mass 
email campaigns. Darkmarket operators run market places on 
the dark web that sell software, data and cybercrime services. 
Botherders run the networks of compromised computers to 
send out spams, or CAAS outputs. Crime IT service brokers 
write code or trade vulnerabilities. Monetizers run the 
operations that extracts fiat money out of various cybercrime 
operations, for example, via cryptocurrency and systems of 
employing money mules [48].  
It is important to note here that the distinction between 
kingpin activities is not always so clear in practice. This is 
because of the necessary interdependency between their roles, 
but also the wherewithal for more than one function to be run 
by an individual or group depending upon the scale of the 
cybercrime operation involved. For example, on a small scale 
an individual or small group can perform the various functions 
themselves, but as the scale of the operation gets larger, then 
there is a necessary division of labour and specialisation of 
skills [48]. 
In fact, the business models of each of the brokerages are 
built around the different ambitions of customers. An analysis 
of a stresser operation, used to launch DDoS attacks, for 
example, found different levels of service ranging from a 
discounted entry level which provided 10 minutes of access to 
the stresser at a discounted cost (and even a $2 one off trial!), 
through to a premium VIP rate costing many thousands of 
dollars. The system was clearly being used by both upstream 
and downstream primary offenders and catered for each [28]. 
In the case of those involved in the TalkTalk attack, it is 
possible/likely that they will have used the cut down and trial 
rates available to them ± though with considerable impact.  
IV. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTERVENTION 
According to BAE Systems, who were engaged by TalkTalk to 
investigate the attack, there might have been up to 10 attackers 
in total [5], however the police arrested six individuals and all 
but one (a boy from London) were convicted. µ&RXUYRLVLHU¶, 
who was mentioned earlier and was possibly involved in the 
sale of data, was also convicted.  
The first arrest took place shortly after the breach and was of 
a 17-year-old who had discovered and exploited the 
vulnerability [59]. Unnamed, for legal reasons, he pleaded 
guilty to seven offences against the Computer Misuse Act 1990. 
In addition to the TalkTalk breach, he had also breached a small 
database of staff and students at the University of Manchester, 
the library at the University of Cambridge and a company 
supplying badges for martial arts. He was sentenced to a 12-
months rehabilitation order [31] at a Norwich Youth Court, 
which, like all Magistrates Courts, does not record the court 
proceedings. It seems that the same person, now aged 19, is now 
being prosecuted and tried for stealing personal data and selling 
it on to criminals [63]. Bisson [5] reported that the Metropolitan 
Police also arrested a 15-year-old in Northern Ireland whose 
identity was protected, but who was named by some news 
sources which he sued (including Twitter) and subsequently 
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settled confidentially [3]. It is not clear from reports how he 
exploited the TalkTalk vulnerability.  
The third person arrested was Daniel Kelley from Llanelli, 
South Wales, who was 18 at the time of arrest. He exploited the 
YXOQHUDELOLW\³WRVWHDOFUHGLWFDUGLQIRUPDWLRQDQGWKHQVHQWD
ransom message to TalkTalk demanding 465 bitcoins (worth 
$125,550 at the time, according to historical pricing data 
compiled by CoinDesk´+Hthreatened to dump the data if the 
ransom was not paid [10]. Kelley was found in possession of 
personal data and credit card information belonging to 5000 
people which he had SXWRQVDOHRQD³KDFNHUW\SHVLWH´ [32]. 
The blackmail charge was eventually dropped because ³WKHWULDO
ZDV QRW LQ WKH SXEOLF LQWHUHVW´, although he was due to be 
sentenced on February 25th and warned that he faced a jail 
sentence [50]. As of April 2019, the sentence was unknown. 
The fourth and fifth were friends Matthew Hanley [4] and 
Connor Allsopp, 20 and 18 respectively at the time they were 
arrested, from Staffordshire [5]. According to news reports, 
Hanley exploited the TalkTalk vulnerability and supplied 
Allsopp with breached personal information of 8000 TalkTalk 
customers, so that Allsopp could monetize the data. Hanley 
recommended Allsopp not to sell the data for less than £1000 
[37]. Both Hanley and Allsopp also supplied data for hacking 
to a third party known as ³5HLJQ´ [11] and ³revealed details of 
how they broke into the site to other people to then exploit´
[59]. They were both handed custodial sentences in 2018. Note 
that some news reports depict Kelley, Hanley and Connor as 
PHPEHUVRIDµJDQJ¶>@  
Finally, Grant WestDNDµCourvoisier¶ [40], allegedly linked 
to selling the TalkTalk data, among data from many other 
breaches, was arrested and tried, though news reports do not 
mention the TalkTalk breach.  
$SSDUHQWO\µ0DUWLDQ¶, the alias used by a person selling the 
data online, was not caught on this occasion, QRUZDVµ5HLJQ¶
who received part of the data from Allsopp. Interestingly, the 
only TalkTalk-related posts that can be retrieved from historical 
data scraped from the now-defunct AlphaBay forum relate to 
Martian.10 &RXUYRLVLHU¶VSRVWVDUHQRORQJHUDYDLODEOH 
 
A. Reflections on the TalkTalk case 
This analysis of the TalkTalk breach shows how complicated 
and distributed, apparently disorganized, a data breach is. There 
is clearly a disconnect between the very high media profile of 
the case, the police investigation and the subsequent 
prosecution(s). Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that the case 
was very high profile, the news reports do not enable a clear 
picture to be established of the relationship between the 
individuals involved. Or, for that matter, what happened to 
those who were arrested (e.g. the London-based boy) or those 
subsequently identified as fraudsters (e.g. Courvoisier and 
Martian). Furthermore, it is also very difficult to connect the 
claim that there were 14,000 attacks with the scant number of 
arrests. 
Even the safer path of obtaining court materials is frustrated 
by the fact that Court¶VUHFRUGVDUHnot easily accessible, if at 
 
10
 We are very grateful to Dr Adam Hardy for advice on this point.  
all; Magistrate Courts do not transcribe the hearings and most 
Crown Court cases are unreported. At the time of writing, we 
are still waiting for authorization to receive transcripts for the 
sentencing of Hanley, Allsopp and Kelley.  
V. REACTIONS BY TALKTALK AND BREACH PREVENTION 
On October 26th TalkTalk reported a sequential attack, but the 
online community corrected them, stating that they were the 
victims of an SQL injections [5]. On November 6th TalkTalk 
revealed that the actual scope of the breach against its website 
was ³PXFKPRUHOLPLWHGWKDQLQLWLDOO\VXVSHFWHG´As reported 
by the BBC, the company stated that the personal information 
of 156,959 customers was compromised and that 15,656 sets of 
banking details and sort codes were stolen [5]. Additionally, 
SD\PHQWFDUGVZHUH³REVFXUHG´DQG³FDQQRWEHXVHGIRU
ILQDQFLDOWUDQVDFWLRQV´On November 11th TalkTalk estimated 
the damage of the breach to range between £30 million and £35 
million resulting from the ³ORVV RI RQOLQH sales and service 
capability´ [5]; TalkTalk recently increased it to £77m [59]. 
TalkTalk¶V former CEO eventually admitted that they got 
their cybersecurity wrong [59]. Indeed, according to the 
,QIRUPDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V2IILFH, TalkTalk was not aware 
of the existence of the unpatched webpages that were exposed 
to SQL injections, which S\PDQWHF UHIHUV WRDV µUXGLPHQWDU\
IRUPVRIDWWDFN¶>@. They had failed to implement even the 
most basic security measures, for example, user input was not 
validated at source and the vulnerable webpages used outdated 
software libraries [18] (p. 4). It is interesting that SQL injection 
was the method by which the initial offenders attacked the 
TalkTalk webpages in July 2015 and on 2&3rd September that 
year [18] (p. 9); both well before the main data breaches in 
October 2015.11 With the benefit of hindsight, had Talktalk 
implemented basic security and data protection measures after 
the initial breaches, they would arguably have not been attacked 
in October 2015 and not faced the ensuing public storm.  
VI. BIG DATA CRIME AND THE LAW 
The synergy between the implementation of data protection 
rules and cybercrime prevention has long been discussed, but 
mostly remained in data protection circles [33][20][34] rather 
than cybersecurity practice. Yet, following the entry into force 
of the GDPR, it is becoming clearer that the early adoption of 
technical and organisational measures to protect personal data 
would reduce the occurrence of breaches [30][34]. Not only 
does the UK National Cyber Security policy [15] acknowledge 
the preventative role of the GDPR [52], but also it leaves all the 
SUHYHQWDWLYHµKHDY\OLIWLQJ¶WRGDWDSURWHFWLRQUXOHV Indeed, the 
GDPR and related Data Protection Act 2018 [54] provide for a 
suite of measures to curb cybercrimes. Firstly, an entity that 
does not take adequate measures to safeguard personal data 
faces harsh administrative fines (Art. 83) which can reach £17 
million or up to 4 per cent of the HQWLW\¶V total worldwide annual 
turnover [34]. What is more, Article 82 of the GDPR gives 
victims who have suffered from material or non-material 
damage as the result of an infringement of the GDPR, such as a 
11
 An interesting timeline of the intervention by the Information 
&RPPLVVLRQHU¶V Office is available at https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-
and-events/talktalk-cyber-attack-how-the-ico-investigation-unfolded/  
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data breach, the right to claim compensation (though with 
caveats). Theoretically, the claim for damages could ironically 
extend to WKHRIIHQGHUVZKRKDYHDEXVHGYLFWLPV¶SHUVRQDOGDWD
because, by virtue of being in possession of stolen personal 
data, the offenders could be construed as data controllers in 
their own right and subject to the terms of the GDPR, including 
its sanctions.  
Secondly, the English and Wales Court of Appeal already 
recognized a claim for non-pecuniary damages in Google Inc. v 
Vidal-Hall & Others [53]. The same Court also recognized that 
misuse of private information can be construed as a tort 
(specifically for the purposes of gaining permission to service 
proceedings outside of the UK).  
Thirdly, under s.170 of the DPA 2018 it is an offence for a 
person knowingly or recklessly to obtain or disclose personal 
data without the consent of the controller, as well as to procure 
the disclosure of personal data to another person without the 
consent of the controller. Furthermore, it is an offence for a 
person to sell, or to offer to sell, personal data obtained in such 
circumstances. This includes the offer to sell personal data, such 
as an advertisement indicating that personal data is or may be 
for sale. Unfortunately, offences under s.170 DPA 2018 are no 
longer punishable with a custodial sentence, because the DPA 
2018 repealed s.77 and s.78 of the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act, which allowed a maximum custodial sentence 
of two years. Actually, s.77 and s.78 were never relied upon, 
because the necessary secondary legislation implementing such 
powers ³was never introduced, despite repeated lobbying by the 
ICO´>61]. Things may change, however, because in November 
2018 the ICO brought a prosecution for the first time under the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990 which was guided by the principles 
established in R v Rollins [2010] UKSC 39 [62] and which 
resulted in a custodial sentence [60]. 
Tortious and, especially, criminal liability leading to 
custodial sentences may have more of a significant effect on 
deterrence than penalties. This point was repeatedly 
recommended by the ICO and other interested parties who 
submitted evidence to the parliamentary inquiry following the 
data breach [14]. We anticipate that the findings of our cascade 
effect research will present a strong argument for encouraging 
the use of all instruments and related penalties across the 
regulatory spectrum against unauthorized data exfiltration 
[34][35]. Furthermore, findings of upcoming research may 
inform regulatory changes [65][48]. For instance, the 
importance of protecting the confidentiality of data other than 
personal data does not find equivalence in criminal law in the 
UK, as the primary objective of the Computer Misuse Act is to 
safeguard the integrity of computers [51] (p. 72). Furthermore, 
s.2 of the Computer Misuse Act1990 [55], read together with 
s.17, may not lay down strong enough rules to counter the effect 
of data dumps and onward sale.  
VII. CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD 
Our analysis of the TalkTalk case study suggests that tipping 
points occur at each stage of the cascade model, for example the 
disclosure of a vulnerability, its exploitation, followed by its 
monetization (selling data), then other offender groups buying 
it, then using it directly to commit crimes or refine it to commit 
future crime, and finally third parties using the pretext of the 
original attack to deceive victims. The TalkTalk case study not 
only illustrates the cascade of cybercrimes from upstream to 
downstream crimes but it also enables us to make five 
observations in conclusion. 
Our first observation is that the analysis and discussion 
illustrates the complexities of online crime groups, especially 
their diverse and distributed (even disorganized) nature when 
compared with contemporary organised crime narratives 
[22][44]. Moreover, the case study details workings that appear 
quite different in a number of ways from more traditional crime 
groups. In TalkTalk, not only had they not met in the flesh, but 
only Hanley and Alsop seemed to know each other in person 
(possibly also Kelley). Moreover, the groups appear to have 
been aware of each other and in competition with one another. 
This is because the ability to monetise a data breach displays 
elements of rivalrous resources, in that consumption by one 
group reduces the ability of another group to consume it. The 
groups mainly conversed on chat forums [37][4] and Skype. 
Our second observation is the relative youth of the offenders 
caught when compared with the seriousness of the impact of 
their offending, although it is very possible that others who 
exploited the breach were not caught. Also significant is that 
their profiles indicate that they are not the burly street criminals 
that the criminal justice is designed for [46].  
Our third observation is that the motivations of those caught 
may have led them to become, for want of a better description, 
µORZKDQJLQJIUXLW¶ and may have made themselves more easily 
identifiable to law enforcement. This is because they were not 
primarily motivated by financial gain. As more than one said in 
court, the underlying motivation was intellectual curiosity and 
to impress friends in order to increase their status in the 
reputational hierarchy of their group (crime forum). It is almost 
as if they were acting in a computer gaming, rather than serious 
crime frame of mind. To this end, the TalkTalk vulnerability 
was simply a vehicle. This certainly applies to one of the two 
minor offenders convicted who did not seem to exploit the 
information for financial gain. The person sentenced at 
1RUZLFK 0DJLVWUDWH¶V &RXUW may have initially not been 
motivated by financial gain, but he is now reportedly being 
prosecuted for stealing and selling personal data [63], so a 
µGULIW¶ LQ WR GHOLQTXHQF\ PD\ EH WDNLQJ SODFH. The extent to 
which this reflection applies to the three young adults convicted 
remains to be seen and we hope will be clarified by the court 
proceedings when they are obtained. All three displayed 
financial acumen, shown not only by asking for a ransom but 
also pricing the data in accordance to their value. Moreover, in 
his judgment the judge did stress their ability to comprehend the 
seriousness of the impact of their offending. Ongoing research 
under the CRITiCal project is seeking to unveil the relationship 
between age at time of offending and motivation. Future 
planned court observations will increase our understanding of 
the prosecution process when establishing the precise nature of 
criminal intent, but also punishment.  
Our fourth observation is that the case sends some blunt 
messages to business organisations to keep on top of their 
computer security during a time where new attack vectors 
appear to be matching or even exceeding attempts to keep 
systems technically secure [27]. Former TalkTalk CEO 
Harding attributed the hack to legacy technology which she 
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described as ³the IT equivalent of an old shed in a field that was 
covered in brambles´>@This observation places even more 
emphasis upon the human factors involved to make the right 
decisions in terms of computer security policy and data 
protection. It also highlights the need to regulate in a consistent 
manner the prevention and minimization of data breaches and 
security incidents [34] and equip the criminal justice system 
with adequate deterrence. 
Our fifth and final observation relates to how hard it is to find 
out information about events in order to research them. There is 
no single reliable data source of information, there is no 
database for arrests, prosecutions and outcomes. But it also 
becomes evident that there are historical, legal, bureaucratic 
and professional reasons why this is the case. In one way it 
GHPRQVWUDWHVWKHµP\WKRIGDWD¶WKDWVHHPVWRH[LVW 
This early conceptualization of the cybercrime cascade effect 
is drawn from a small part of a much larger interdisciplinary 
project (CRITiCal) which explores changes in the cybercrime 
landscape resulting from cloud technologies and IoT, of which 
Big Data Crime is one such development [47][35]. These 
findings will provide a framework for exploring and analysing 
cloud crimes and identifying a broader pool of offender types 
to help tailor appropriate interventions against them to prevent 
further transgression and prevent cybercrime. The findings of 
this detailed study inform our larger investigation based on 
mixed methods and a blend of legal empirical analysis and 
criminological analysis. This will include the analysis of 
additional case studies of data breaches and cybercrimes 
dLVSOD\LQJ µFDVFDGH¶ HOHPHQWV DQG the related sentencing of 
responsible individuals, analysis also based on data science and 
machine learning. It will eventually help corroborate the 
relative importance of tipping points, such as the publication of 
details of a vulnerability and the dump of data, as well as make 
recommendations for changes to the legal framework and its 
implementation within the criminal justice system. 
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